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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

NINTH CIRCUIT
American Rivers v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 187 F.3d 1007
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that: (1) use of existing environmental
conditions as a baseline was proper under FPA and NEPA; (2) under
the no action alternative, license denial and project decommissioning
does not have to be an alternative; and (3) while § 100) of FPA
allowed discretion regarding recommendations by other agencies,
FERC cannot reject the Secretary of Interior's properly prescribed
fishways under FPA § 18).
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") granted a
new license to Eugene Water and Electric Board, the incumbent
licensee of two hydroelectric power plants. Petitioners consisted of a
variety of environmental and conservation groups, the United States
Department of the Interior and the Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife ("Petitioners"). After the Director of FERC rejected a request
for rehearing, the Petitioners consolidated their petitions and
challenged the license's renewal.
They contended that FERC
performed inadequate environmental analysis under the Federal
Power Act ("FPA") and National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").
Petitioners also alleged FERC violated §§ 10(j) and 18 of the FPA by
improperly making threshold determinations as to the sufficiency of a
recommendation.
Pursuant to NEPA, FERC prepared a final environmental impact
statement, which considered the incumbent's re-licensing proposal as
well as five alternatives. Of the five alternatives, FERC defined its no
action alternative as renewing the existing license without additional
environmental protection or enhancement measures.
The Petitioners recommended FERC adopt several measures to
protect the environment. FERC recommended complete adoption of
the Department of Fish and Wildlife and the Department of Interior's
recommendation of fish ladders and screens, but determined the
remaining conditions were outside the scope of the fishway
prescriptions as required in section 18 of the FPA. FERC instead
created a plan requiring the incumbent licensee to consult with the
state and federal agencies to develop plans for FERC's approval.
Petitioners challenged FERC's construction of the FPA and the
baseline assessment. The court of appeals applied the first part of the
Chevron test, and found an absence of any language directed to the
issue. Applying the second part of the Chevron test, the court stated
that when legislation is silent, an assumption applies that Congress left
statutory construction to the discretion of the agency administering
the program. The court determined that when assessing a baseline to
contrast the NEPA-required alternatives, FERC's use of present
environmental conditions was acceptable. The court concluded that
Petitioners' suggested baseline, which consisted of conditions
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occurring before the hydroelectric power plants existed, was not
pragmatic. The power plants' operation in the area for over fifty years
resulted in tremendous amounts of environmental change, making it
virtually impossible to recreate the conditions. The court found that
adopting existing conditions as a baseline did not itself preclude
inclusion of conditions that would mitigate or reduce any negative
environmental impacts.
When considering the NEPA-required alternatives, the court
applied the rule of reason to determine if FERC thoroughly
considered all possible environmental consequences.
Petitioners
contended FERC's definition of no action violated NEPA by not
considering the full range of alternatives available.
The court
determined that while NEPA required the inclusion of a no action
alternative, FERC did not violate NEPA when defining the no action
alternative as maintaining status quo by reissuing the same license with
no new environmental provisions. The rule of reason required that
FERC consider only the alternatives that were reasonable and feasible.
The court pointed to a directive by the Council of Environmental
Quality that stated that no action alternatives may be thought of in
terms of continuing with the present course of action until that action
was changed. Thus, the court found that FERC need not consider an
infinite number of alternatives.
In applying the traditional Chevron test, the court focused on
whether FERC violated FPA by rejecting recommendations from other
Fish and Wildlife agencies. The court pointed to section 10(j) (1) of
FPA, which required FERC to impose conditions that protect the
environment. The court found that section 10(j)(1) was subject to
section 10(j) (2). Applying step one of the Chevron test, the court
pointed out that the language of section 10(j) (2) granted FERC, after
thoroughly reviewing the Agencies' recommendations, the discretion
to reject those recommendations. The statute further required a
finding that the recommendations were inconsistent with purpose and
law for a rejection. Any subsequent conditions had to in fact protect
and mitigate damage to fish and wildlife. The court noted that while
FERC normally must afford significant deference to the Agencies'
recommendations, Congress itself has ordained that such deference
yielded to FERC'sjudgment when conflict occurred.
In contrast, the court noted that the language present in section
10(j)(2), allowing for discretion of FERC to reject certain
recommendations, was absent in section 18 of the FPA. The court
concluded that the language of section 18 clearly required FERC to
adopt recommendations made by the Secretary of the Interior
regarding fishways. Since section 18 did not have a qualifying
provision like section 10(j) (1), the court found FERC had to consider
input from the Department of Interior. FERC did not have the
authority to decide when section 18 fishways were beyond the section's
scope, and thus could not reject a properly prescribed section 18
fishway outright.
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